Tuesday, June 10th ~ Workshop Breakout Schedules from 09:00 to 10:30
SEE
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SRPoiSE
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STIR
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Bios & Abstracts from this session
Confronting bias at the science-‐policy interface in the context of global environmental change
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Authors: Vanessa Schweizer, University of Waterloo
Abstract: Global environmental change is characterized by phenomena that are large-‐ scale (e.g. areas crossing political borders, often those of nation-‐states), long-‐term (spanning multiple decades if not centuries), and due to human activities, many of which are beneficial locally or during the near-‐term. A host of philosophical quandaries are connected to global environmental change, and two will be addressed in this paper. First, what measures can current generations take to avoid repeating environmental change mistakes of the past? Scientific research aims to address this question, but unconventional tools, such as simulation, are often required. Philosophically, the challenge for simulation is to retain scientific credibility, and this will be considered through the lens of objectivity. Second, once promising alternative measures are identified for environmental protection, how can they be institutionalized (whether they be new regulations or market incentives)? Policy analysis aims to address this question, but political realities are rarely as straightforward as policy models suggest. Thus, the challenge for policy advice is to win social support. An influential framework developed by practicing scientists and policy analysts that describes the marriage of these quandaries is for ‘knowledge systems’ (Cash et al. 2003), or institutional arrangements that effectively utilize scientific and technical knowledge for achieving sustainability. In successful knowledge systems, an appropriate balance is struck between scientific credibility, salience (or policy relevance), and legitimacy. Regarding legitimacy, Cash and colleagues note, “Legitimacy reflects the perception that the production of information and technology has been respectful of stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of opposing views and interests” (Cash et al. 2003 p. 8086, emphasis in original). Philosophically, this balance resembles some of the demands of pragmatism described by John Dewey. In both the scientific and policy domains, a shared concern is the infiltration of bias; in the scientific domain, objectivity is the primary weapon, while in the policy domain, pragmatism may be an appropriate tool. Using climate change as a particular example of a global environmental change problem, this paper will examine the all-‐too-‐familiar threat of bias in both scientific research and policy discussions. Whether philosophical work on objectivity and pragmatism may have lessons to share will also be explored.
Bio: My research interests are cross-disciplinary knowledge integration (qualitative and quantitative) for the design of scientifically defensible scenarios exploring the human dimensions of large-scale environmental change (e.g. climate change). The purpose of such work is to cut through competing political claims to highlight robust risks to society (where 'society' can mean any level of social organization relevant to the analysis). I am building on work that demonstrates a technique for such cross-disciplinary knowledge integration (Schweizer and Kriegler, 2012) as well as articulates the philosophical merits of constructing scenarios in this way (Lloyd and Schweizer, in press). I have been inspired by the work of practicing scientists (and Martin Kowarsch, a philosopher of science) to articulate a new direction for policy-relevant climate change research (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2012). Pragmatism (in the tradition of John Dewey) has been suggested as the philosophical guidepost for this new direction. I am exploring this idea and looking for commentators or collaborators for this work, as I am more of a science practitioner than a philosopher. Nevertheless, philosophy can offer helpful guidance to practicing scientists, and hopefully developments on the frontlines of climate science and policy can do the same for philosophy.
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Intellectual Property Rights and Global Climate Change: An Ethical/Epistemological Dilemma
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Authors: Justin B. Biddle, Georgia Tech
Abstract: This paper addresses an important but neglected dilemma that must be resolved in order to respond ethically to global climate change. The dilemma can be presented as follows. Responding ethically to global climate change requires technological innovation that is accessible to everyone, including inhabitants of the least developed countries. Moreover, technological innovation requires strong intellectual property protection, especially patent protection. Defenders of this latter claim argue plausibly that technological innovation requires significant private investment in research and development and that firms will invest only if they are guaranteed the possibility of obtaining a return on their investments through strong patent protection. At the same time, strong patent protection makes it highly unlikely that patent-protected technologies will be accessible to developing countries at affordable prices. Given this, it appears that responding ethically to global climate change is highly unlikely. I will refer to this dilemma as the patent dilemma in global climate change.
In some respects, the patent dilemma in global climate change is similar to dilemmas that result from patenting in general. Patents incentivize innovation, and thus can have epistemic benefits, but the monopolies provided by patents make it difficult for the poor to access those innovations at prices that they can afford. The patent dilemma in medical research, particularly as it pertains to access to medicines in developing countries, is an example of this. But the patent dilemma in global climate change involves a moral challenge that is absent from other patent dilemmas, because the climate change to which developing countries are forced to respond is caused by human activity – in particular, the activities of developed, industrialized nations. It is a serious moral failing that developed nations have allowed (and continue to allow) millions in developing countries to die of diseases that could be cured by patented medicines. But it would be even more blameworthy to create technologies that could help developing countries respond to the climate impacts that we in the developed world have caused, and then to allow patents to inhibit access to those technologies.
Despite the importance of the patent dilemma in global climate change – including its importance in climate negotiations such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – neither philosophers of science nor environmental philosophers have engaged with the dilemma in a serious way. In this paper, I will present the dilemma in detail, and I will argue that it deserves be taken seriously. I will then outline some possible strategies for resolving it. While some of these strategies are promising and worthy of pursuit, they all face significant obstacles, and none represents a general solution to the problem. I will conclude by discussing some of the policy implications of the dilemma.
Bio: My research interests are cross-disciplinary knowledge integration (qualitative and quantitative) for the design of scientifically defensible scenarios exploring the human dimensions of large-scale environmental change (e.g. climate change). The purpose of such work is to cut through competing political claims to highlight robust risks to society (where 'society' can mean any level of social organization relevant to the analysis). I am building on work that demonstrates a technique for such cross-disciplinary knowledge integration (Schweizer and Kriegler, 2012) as well as articulates the philosophical merits of constructing scenarios in this way (Lloyd and Schweizer, in press). I have been inspired by the work of practicing scientists (and Martin Kowarsch, a philosopher of science) to articulate a new direction for policy-relevant climate change research (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2012). Pragmatism (in the tradition of John Dewey) has been suggested as the philosophical guidepost for this new direction. I am exploring this idea and looking for commentators or collaborators for this work, as I am more of a science practitioner than a philosopher. Nevertheless, philosophy can offer helpful guidance to practicing scientists, and hopefully developments on the frontlines of climate science and policy can do the same for philosophy.
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The Politics of Expertise in Monsanto v Schmeiser
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Authors: Kelly Bronson, St Thomas University
Abstract: I will present an analysis of the politics of expertise for farmer and governance---corporate, regulatory and legal---knowledges in disputes over genetically engineered (GE) seeds in Canada. Drawing on ethnographic data and textual analysis of legal decisions, I highlight the differential value placed on scientific and local-ecological knowledges in the ongoing struggle over biotechnology's knowledge- power structures. This struggle is taking place across scientific and legal institutions and daily lives, though my study's analytic focus is on one highly visible (internationally followed) court case: [1998] Monsanto v. Schmeiser.
What is most relevant to SEESHOP is how the legal reasoning in these court cases appears to draw on a very limited notion of expertise. One minor example: Throughout his documents to the courts and in his direct testimony, the defendant, Percy Schmeiser, attempted to establish himself as a plant- breeding expert in line with accepted STS understanding of expertise as mastery over tacit knowledge gained through enculturation (Collins 2007, 24): "After growing canola over many years, Mr. Schmeiser has developed his own farming practices particular to the land that he farms, which practices have withstood experimentation and the test of time" ([2004] Factum, para. 14, emphasis mine). In their written decisions in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, however, all levels of the court invoke a particularly narrow notion of scientific expertise that is limited to laboratory-based practices. In fact, it is on the basis of "the genetic testing of scientists in St. Louis" ([1998] Federal Trial Court, para. 48) that the courts make a final ruling.
Ultimately, this case study suggest that legal actors may benefit from a model for expertise. This empirical work is relevant to SEE because it attempts to address the place for technical expertise in governance processes (incl. court rulings on GE). The application of normative models has both political and disciplinary significance; one consequence of the courts operating without a model for deciding on how to constitute legitimate expert knowledge in Monsanto v. Schmeiser is the continued exclusion of members of the public from technical decision-making on GE."
Bio: Not too long ago Kelly was a full-fledged lab-bench scientist but she left this life out of curiosity for the broader interactions of science in society. This curiosity about science-society relations and a desire to build sustainable ones still stands at the heart of Kelly's science and technology studies work.
Kelly is developing a science communication and public policy laboratory at St. Thomas that will have the following as its over-arching aim: to bring publics closer to scientific knowledge production and dissemination. One of the lab’s first empirical projects focuses on citizen engagements with hydraulic fracturing technique via the New Brunswick Energy Institute roundtable processes. Kelly would welcome collaborations on this project, especially among those from disciplinary traditions outside of STS.
Kelly has been the Editorial Assistant for the journal TOPIA, she has helped to develop science policy at the federal and municipal levels and she has published on topics ranging from science communication to food-related risk. She currently teaches in STS at a small, liberal arts university and loves her time in the classroom.
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Contexts Shaping “the nature of expertise and the rights that accrue”: Rip’s critique of S.E.E.
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Authors: Dave Caudill, Villanova University
Abstract: I refer to Arie Rip’s critique of third wave as decontextualized, as discussing expertise as if there was no context (e.g., the role of institutional processes, which SEE allegedly ignores, are relevant to the epistemological status of the outcome). I will revisit Rip’s critique of Harry/Rob, to focus on the (missing) context argument, and think about two contexts: (1) the institutional process of acquiring expertise in the courtroom (does SEE ignore that in categorizing expertise?); and (2) the economic context of science, whether the economy merely provides supports (and temptations for bad apples) or whether it affects science systemically and structurally. Mirowski in Science-Mart (2011) argues that systemic effects are pernicious, but he cannot seem to come up with any examples, and the examples he does offer are all examples of bad apples/ fraud, so he ends up with a Mertonian sociology of error. I think Kleinman’s Impure Cultures (2003) gives better examples of the indirect effects of commercialization on science. Then the question is whether contexts (such as (i) the economy, or (ii) the courtroom) function sort of like "politics" in S.E.E. (the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction), and whether they are relevant for epistemological status (as Rip suggests they are, and as Rip suggests Rob/Harry ignore). I don't want to just talk theory, but use examples of S.E.E. analyses to test Rip's concerns.
Ultimately, this case study suggest that legal actors may benefit from a model for expertise. This empirical work is relevant to SEE because it attempts to address the place for technical expertise in governance processes (incl. court rulings on GE). The application of normative models has both political and disciplinary significance; one consequence of the courts operating without a model for deciding on how to constitute legitimate expert knowledge in Monsanto v. Schmeiser is the continued exclusion of members of the public from technical decision-making on GE."
Bio: I am a law professor interested in (standards for) scientific expertise in litigation and regulatory contexts; I'm currently working on effects of the economy on science; I have a law degree and 7 years experience in law practice, I have a Ph.D. in philosophy with an emphasis on philosophy of science, and I have been active for years in the sociology of science/science & technology studies/SEE. I'm giving a paper at the SEE meetings on the critique of SEE. I like the STIR presentations at the Arizona conference last year.
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