Monday, June 9th ~ Workshop Breakout Schedules from 13:30 to 15:45
SEE
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SRPoiSE
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STIR
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Bios & Abstracts from this session
SEE: Intrinsic Politics
Authors: Darrin Durant, University of Melbourne
Abstract: There is much debate in our field about who has the best account of the politics of expertise. While Jasanoff, Wynne and co argue for more public participation, Collins and Evans argue this poses the problem of extension. When do we limit public participation and how do we decide what counts as legitimate expertise separate from political rights to participate in decision-making? Often over-looked in this dispute is the amount of common ground, and thus a deflationary approach of being the first one reasonable enough to blink might be warranted. We all agree that extrinsic politics should play no part in good science. Critics of Collins and Evans actually presuppose this point in decrying cases of inequality of opportunity leading to unjust shaping of outcomes. This normative overlap needs to be made clear. We also agree that policy-making is hardly legitimate when it simply rewards direct power and money. This normative overlap needs to be made clear too. So far we are all on the same page with regard to extrinsic politics. The true place of conflict is about intrinsic politics. Critics of Collins and Evans can be said to have pushed the critique of intrinsic politics too far. Collins and Evans to date have mostly concentrated on the way such critiques undermine the very idea of expertise itself. We need to add to it the normative point that being too critical of intrinsic politics can lapse into anti-egalitarianism in the name of egalitarianism. But we can also fail to go far enough in the interrogation of intrinsic politics, giving it a free pass, and here the critics of Collins and Evans have a point in calling for the interrogation of opportunity structures. Future work in the tradition of the Third Wave can seek to address a new problem of extension: how far in critiquing intrinsic politics is too far? I outline an answer that draws upon debates in political theory about equality of opportunity. My discussion is pitched at the level of theory in the hope of outlining lessons and approaches of general portability and applicability.
Bio: I am interested in the politics of expertise. I have done a lot of work on energy debates, especially the nuclear waste and nuclear power issue. I have published numerous papers analyzing the theme of public participation in the making of policy involving technical knowledge, as well as work on the way expertise and democracy go or do not go together, not to mention work on energy politics. I am currently working on a set of papers tackling the concept of a typology of interests to help guide our normative thinking about how expertise and democracy hangs together, as well as an embryonic study of the Australian Climate Council, formed after the newly elected right-wing conservative so-called Prime Minister disbanded the Federally backed Climate Commission. My approach to all of this is to combine Science and Technology Studies (STS) with Political Philosophy, an approach that builds upon my STS background. What's next? I want to treat the Climate Council as a case study in what happens to communication about science when you go from a government backed body to an outcast voluntary association. Otherwise I plan to continue to write about democracy and how it might best work with expertise. Collaborators are always nice.
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SEE: The Essence of Technocracy. And, What Role for Cardiff?
Authors: Jathan Sadowski, University of Melbourne
Abstract: Although much criticism has been leveled against technocracy, the multi-layered problem has yet to be classified in taxonomic form. We rectify this omission by identifying central domains where technocracy emerges, the basic means by which technocratic power is instantiated, and the quintessential types of harms technocratic discipline engenders. This taxonomic analysis will set the stage for an open discussion about what SEE can and should offer to a better understanding, description, and critique of technocratic theory and practice.
Bio: Jathan Sadowski is a freelance writer and PhD student in the Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology program at Arizona State University. He primarily researches and writes about social justice and political economy of technologies––all of which is informed by his background in philosophy of technology, social/political theory, and applied ethics. His dissertation is about "smart cities."
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SEE: Struggling Over Climate Science: “Consensus" and “Skepticism" in the Space of Opinion
Authors: John McLevey, University of Waterloo
Abstract: This article contributes to the recent turn towards expertise in science studies and the sociology of intellectuals by examining struggles over climate science in the opinion sections of Canadian newspapers. Based on a correspondence analysis of 3,242 opinion pieces, I identify a cluster of articles that (i.) explicitly reject anthropogenic climate change, (ii.) challenge the credibility of climate scientists, and (iii.) reject policy responses to climate change. These articles are written by columnists, think tank researchers, and academics without relevant "experiential expertise" in climate science, and are published in conservative newspapers. Next, I use qualitative methods to identify two strategies that skeptics use to challenge the credibility of climate science. First, skeptics play on the scientific and political meanings of skepticism and consensus, framing climate science as authoritarian and bureaucratic. Second, skeptics personalize science by smearing high profile scientists and environmentalists, and by chipping away at the integrity of rank and file scientists. Together, these strategies define climate change skeptics as more scientific than climate scientists themselves.
Bio: I'm trained as a sociologist, but my work is mostly interdisciplinary. My main projects right now include work on idea production and communication in think tanks, struggles over expertise on climate science and policy, and the network structures of large scale collaborations in science and technology. I'm a multi-method research, primarily interested in qualitative comparative methods, and social network analysis. I'm always looking for interesting collaborators!
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SRPoiSE: Philosophical Engagement with Scientists: Attitudes on Values in Science
Keywords: Philosophical engagement, values in science, the Toolbox Project, scientists’ attitudes, demographic differences
Authors: Michael O’Rourke, Dan Steel, Chad Gonnerman, Michigan State University
Abstract: Socially relevant philosophy of/in science and engineering (SRPoiSE) is a multi- faceted phenomenon, a much-needed response to demands for (1) philosophical research on scientific practices and results that directly affect public welfare, (2) philosophical reflection on and engagement with those who contribute to and are impacted by scientific activities, and (3) widespread dissemination of philosophical results that extend beyond the traditional walls of philosophy (Fehr & Plaisance, 2010). In this paper, we are most immediately interested in the second facet of SRPoiSE, especially as it relates to philosophy’s potential to serve as an intellectual liaison between scientific disciplines engaged in cross-disciplinary activity. It is our contention that if philosophers are to play the liaison role well, we need to know what scientists think about matters that can divide them when they collaborate. In this paper, we take one step towards achieving this goal. Using data acquired from the Toolbox Project, we address the question, what are the attitudes of practicing scientists – specifically those engaged in or closely associated with collaborative, cross-disciplinary science – regarding the proper role of “non- cognitive” or “non-epistemic” values in science?
An analysis of these data suggests that cross-disciplinary scientists are, in general, reluctant to embrace a value-free science. They tend to agree with Longino (1990) that objectivity does not require individual scientists to be value-neutral. They also tend to agree with Douglas (2009) that non-epistemic values can appropriately influence decisions about what evidence is sufficient for accepting a claim. Finally, they tend to agree that scientists should engage in advocacy in relation to their work, a position consistent with Kourany’s (2010) view that science should be committed to the advocacy of goals like justice and equality.
Bio: Chad Gonnerman joined the philosophy department at Michigan State University in Fall 2013, after having received his PhD in philosophy from Indiana University. His work is largely at the interface of philosophy of science, with work on the structural nature of concepts, epistemic status of philosophical intuitions, egocentric biases in mindreading, and philosophy’s ability to enhance cross-disciplinary and transdisciplinary understanding and communication.
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SRPoiSE: Epistemologies of Ignorance and Interdisciplinary Research
Keywords: interdisciplinary research, epistemologies of ignorance, epistemic integration
Authors: Chad Gonnerman, Erik Jensen, Anna Malavisi, Ken Marable, Michael O'Rourke, Ezgi Sertler, and Zachary Piso. Michigan State University
Abstract: This paper explores the intersection of interdisciplinary research and epistemologies of ignorance. Interdisciplinary research is frequently championed as a necessary approach to complex social and environmental problems. By leveraging the differences among scientific knowledge cultures, interdisciplinary engagement with social and environmental problems aspires to address the multiple components of these problems and the ways these components systematically interact. Integration across multiple disciplinary perspectives is understood to broaden the knowledge base of research teams, increasing their ability to investigate these complex problems. Philosophical examination of interdisciplinarity has addressed the epistemological dimensions of knowledge integration involving distinctive disciplinary cultures (e.g. Brigandt 2010). Because contributions from different knowledge cultures are not easily integrated—in other words, because interdisciplinarity is not so simple as "add disciplines and stir"—integration relies on crucial epistemic practices that shape what perspectives contribute to problem-solving and how these perspectives are organized.
This paper is a contribution to the epistemology of interdisciplinary integration; in particular, we draw from the epistemology of ignorance to focus on how interdisciplinary integration may systematically obscure certain values. We begin with a brief characterization of how knowledge is disciplined through scientific specialization. While disciplining knowledge yields powerful methods of interacting with and investigating the world, it does so by privileging certain ways of seeing, knowing and interacting over alternatives. How we approach social-environmental problems is shaped by our knowledge and our ignorance. Together, these foreground certain elements of a problem and background others, supporting responses that will have a differential and potentially unjust impact on affected communities (e.g., local businesses, or school-age children). Interdisciplinary research leverages multiple ways of disciplining knowledge in order to develop approaches to social-environmental problems that might justly serve diverse communities. Key decisions concerning integration then are not simply epistemic—they should be thought of as "coupled ethical-epistemic" decisions, bearing on how the research team prioritizes certain ideals (Tuana 2010).
In order to make more just decisions when integrating across multiple disciplines, norms that inform how knowledge is included and organized should be subject to careful criticism. Resources for systematizing this criticism are drawn from philosophical literature concerning the epistemology of ignorance. We review several taxonomies of ignorance (e.g. Smithson 2008, Alcoff 2007, Tuana 2006, Townley 2006) and derive three fundamental dimensions of ignorance: (1) whether we are aware or unaware of the ignorance, (2) whether we are complicit in the persistence of the ignorance, and (3) whether the ignorance persists through the construction of epistemically disadvantaged identities. We then use these dimensions to analyze a specific interdisciplinary effort. This case study reveals how norms present in interdisciplinary research entail the systematic presence of certain ignorances. By carefully considering how decisions regarding the integration of knowledge may systematically privilege certain knowledge, interdisciplinary research teams can work to manage ignorance and avoid unjustly privileging certain ideals.
Bio: My research interests are applied/global ethics, feminist epistemology and social and political philosophy. I am currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at MSU completing my dissertation on global development. I have a Master of Health and International Development and worked for 16 years in Latin America in the NGO sector in areas of development practice and management. In my dissertation I offer a more in-depth analysis and understanding of the current development paradigm, its theory and practice. I argue that implementing a strong ethical approach to development and understanding epistemic injustice in development will help to respond to severe global problems such as poverty and hunger in a different way.
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SRPoiSE: Transdisciplinary Collaboration in Science: Should it be the Norm?
Authors: Janet Michaud, University of Waterloo
Abstract: The terms 'interdisciplinarity' and ‘interdisciplinary collaboration’ have become buzzwords amongst academics within the last decade; they are often used to attract attention in grant and scholarship writing. However, as the topic has gained more traction in the literature, distinctions have been made between different types of approaches to collaborative work across disciplines; namely, multidisciplinary (Gorman 2002), interdisciplinary (Kellert 2008; Repko 2012), and transdisciplinary approaches (Klein 1990; Leavy 2011), among others.
In this paper, I will ask which approach is best suited to fulfill the aims of social epistemologists of science, such as Helen Longino, who are concerned with diversity in scientific communities. In Longino’s critical contextual empiricism she claims that, in order to make scientific practice and knowledge more objective, we must ensure that there is sufficient critical interaction, uptake, and tempered equality of intellectual authority within scientific communities (1990, 1994, 2002). My aim is to determine, in cases where we value the objectivity of scientific knowledge, which collaborative approach would more easily incorporate the values that Longino claims are necessary to produce fruitful scientific knowledge — both for the communities who produce it and the publics who are affected by it.
I will argue that a transdisciplinary approach puts collaborators in the best position possible to promote helpful critical interactions, uptake, and tempered equality of intellectual authority. Therefore, scientists ought to have more and better opportunities to engage in transdisciplinary collaboration in cases where it is possible and beneficial for them to engage in that type of work. Transdisciplinarity aims for collaborators to leave behind the biases, methods, and background assumptions of their disciplines in order to engage in properly cohesive and inclusive collaboration with others from diverse backgrounds and disciplines. Thus, transdisciplinarity allows each collaborative experience to develop its own methods and values free from the influence of inappropriate biases and intellectual authority brought about by disciplinary approaches, readily allowing for tempered equality and uptake. Moreover, the transdisciplinary approach demands that stakeholders also play a role in collaboration; Longino’s criteria allows these collaborators to participate effectively in the collaborative work by ensuring that they are also included in the process. Thus I will conclude that transdisciplinary approaches to collaboration will more likely produce diverse communities that can produce fruitful knowledge that meets the epistemic and pragmatic goals of the community and the publics that they serve.
Bio: My main areas of research are social and feminist epistemologies and feminist philosophy of science. I also have interests in interdisciplinary collaboration and experimental philosophy as they pertain to the former. My aim is to approach these interests with an eye to their relevance outside of philosophy and, when possible, outside of the academic sphere altogether. I'm always looking for opportunities to collaborate with people both inside and outside of philosophy.
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STIR: From ethnography to engagement: The lab as a site of intervention
Authors: Gjefsen and Fisher
The purpose and value of integrating social sciences and humanities (SSH) in technical and natural sciences may not be intuitively obvious and requires reflection on the interpretive, normative and instrumental implications of such integration. The shape of SSH contributions are likely to depend on several factors, including the formulation of expectations, the choice of intervention sites, and the design of new forms of interaction and collaboration. Here we examine the scope for influence in a specific context – the scientific laboratory – whose properties both as a site and as a level of intervention define parameters for integrating SSH reflexivity. We draw on laboratory ethnography and on the more recent emergence of laboratory engagement and associated methods of intervention and collaborative inquiry into the decisions and underlying attitudes of day-to-day activities of research and innovation practitioners. We suggest that attempts to institutionalize SSH as legitimate participants in the social shaping of research and innovation will require interventions that are both effective at informing local practices within specific sites and at the same time are attuned to the multiple sites, stages and levels which structure innovation processes. As a key site of production for knowledge, technology and expertise, the laboratory is a promising avenue for new forms of SSH integration and collaborative inquiry, the demonstrable outcomes of which illustrate how choices concerning SSH integration sites structures the scope of influence on science-society relations.
Authors: Gjefsen and Fisher
The purpose and value of integrating social sciences and humanities (SSH) in technical and natural sciences may not be intuitively obvious and requires reflection on the interpretive, normative and instrumental implications of such integration. The shape of SSH contributions are likely to depend on several factors, including the formulation of expectations, the choice of intervention sites, and the design of new forms of interaction and collaboration. Here we examine the scope for influence in a specific context – the scientific laboratory – whose properties both as a site and as a level of intervention define parameters for integrating SSH reflexivity. We draw on laboratory ethnography and on the more recent emergence of laboratory engagement and associated methods of intervention and collaborative inquiry into the decisions and underlying attitudes of day-to-day activities of research and innovation practitioners. We suggest that attempts to institutionalize SSH as legitimate participants in the social shaping of research and innovation will require interventions that are both effective at informing local practices within specific sites and at the same time are attuned to the multiple sites, stages and levels which structure innovation processes. As a key site of production for knowledge, technology and expertise, the laboratory is a promising avenue for new forms of SSH integration and collaborative inquiry, the demonstrable outcomes of which illustrate how choices concerning SSH integration sites structures the scope of influence on science-society relations.